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ABSTRACT 
 
The management’s responsibility is to monitor the employee’s performance but when it 
becomes a desire of the management to snoop/spy the employees’ performance then 
this act has a direct influence on the employees and their motivations. The paper 
investigates the effects of top management’s spying/snooping in the organization on 
employees’ productivity and job commitment. For the purpose a sample of 3500 
employees via self-administered survey technique were analyzed. Tobit Model 
(Censored regression) has been used to interrogate the effect of snooping/ spying on 
employee productivity and commitment. Tobit Model marked findings that the approach 
of top management to snoop/spy on the employees’ productivity and job commitment 
affects adversely on the employees. Policy makers should adopt informal ways to 
practice snooping as it causes stress, mental illness, de-motivation and especially when 
snooping is via other co-workers and employees, it creates major disruption and a rise 
to politicking in organization, which effect the proper streamlining of business operations 
across the departments. 
 
Key words: Organizational spying/snooping, job commitment, employees’ productivity, 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a work environment, it is a norm that the employees are monitored for their work 
performance (Vorvoreanu and Botan, 2001). Now at workplaces, no matter it is tech 
savvy or a nominal one, a worker’s each working step is subject to snooping (Meeks, 
2010). 
Undercover checking on the performance of the employees by the top management 
has borne many issues but recently it has been known that spying leads to stress and 
consequently reduces performance. With the advancement of technology, spying has 
become easier as there are loads of electronic devices available to scrutinize especially 
in the American workplace environment (Vorvoreanu and Botan, 2001).  
  
The research indicates that organizations use the spying approach to monitor the 
workforce productivity, misconduct and compliance with employer’s workplace policies 
(Lasprogata et al., 2004). 
Studies have affirmed that there is strong association of decreased job satisfaction 
with the mentoring via electronic devices (Aiello and Kolb, 1995). If there is job 
dissatisfaction then this will also lead to less job commitment.  
The ratio of the employers to spy on their employee is on the high side and mostly 
80% of the employers also disclose their spying practice to their employees and it was 
revealed that employees at their work stations do use computer for personal reasons 
but it does not affect the job’s productivity (Al- Rjoub et al., 2008). 
Primarily, this study clearly examines to identify the top management’s spying effect 
on employees’ productivity and job commitment whether it is done with electronic 
devices and/or through other means(under cover employees to monitor other 
employees).  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Workplace privacy is dead and buried a long time ago. Employers do monitor e-mails, 
eavesdrop on telephone calls observe Internet access and lookout on workers with 
hidden cameras. Some companies have even installed cameras in the bathrooms. 
Though it is unethical to record the telephone calls’ and spy around in one’s personal 
life, which is the non-traditional ways of snooping over employees. Equity theory puts 
forwards the unbalancing act of employees due to the surveillance due to the direct and 
direct exchanges. Due to surveillance managers gain extra power and control over 
employees because employees understand that such kind of surveillance is always in 
the favor of the management. Similar to this theory is the concept of resistance, which 
explained that due to the surveillance employees behavior turns out to be negative.  
Specific research by Aiello and Kolb (1995) highlights that if skilled workers are 
monitored, they tend to bring higher performance and a faster work-orientation i.e. a 
positive outcome and if unskilled workers are monitored, they tend to bring lower 
performance that is, a negative outcome. It was also found that monitoring does cause 
certain level of stress to any category of employees/workers. Larson and Callahan 
  
(1990) mentioned about group level screening is not that effective as individual 
screening over employees work assignments and attitude. 
According to Meeks (2000), Organizations as routine monitor their employee and has 
become now a part of their workplace practice. For instance, Xerox organization sacked 
40 of their employees due to the mal-use of the internet.  
The analysis conducted by Vorvoreanu and Botan (2001) determined significant 
relationship between surveillance and performance. Surveillance has a negative effect 
on the workplace culture. At a broad-spectrum, stress and privacy invasion are the two 
main pointers which not only are the consequences of monitoring but might also 
decrease performance and quality of work. Others factors such as job commitment and 
motivation towards work will be another disturbance by the employees.  
Rjoub et al. (2008) revealed that certain employees do have a high regard to be 
monitored to improve their behavior in the workplace and to improve the relationship 
with co-workers. In this case, employees do not care about the organization’s 
performance. In addition, the findings also showed that the percentage of people who 
prefer spying/monitoring are not higher than the percentage of people who do not want 
to be monitored. In short, employers always have a desire to snoop around the 
workplace and employees don’t feel this as a good way to form appraisal or check on 
them.  
Apart from being surveyed or monitored by physical presence of an employer, video 
monitoring is a lot in use. Dixon (1995) stated that the introduction of video surveillance 
is the most damaging variable between employee and employer relation. The research 
study stated that in the U.S. any mode of monitoring/spying over employees, are the 
major stress cause at workplace.  
The study conducted by Ahmed (2007) on analysis of workplace surveillance which 
was conducted on university employees, found out that 66% of the employees were 
positive about the surveillance, while remaining 33% were intrusive and had a negative 
appeal on the monitoring practices. 
LaNuez and Jermier (1994) mentioned in the chapter of neglected patterns of 
resistance at work that electronic control system can lead to disruption. Resistance, 
which is the opposing force, occurs when the employee freedom is threatened. Here, 
  
the freedom is threatened by monitoring and surveillance by employer in order to 
measure performance of employee.   
The research by Morgan (1987) concluded that not only does electronic monitoring 
have the capability to negatively influence working situations and already aware cause 
of it is extreme stress, also, it may actually generate depression at work, low clarity and 
task variety, peer social support depression, supervisory support depression, job loss 
fright and lack of control and autonomy over tasks. This supports that electronic 
monitoring can cause a decline in job productivity and commitment.  
This paper has broadly marked the effects of top management spying/snooping in 
organization, if any, on employee’s productivity and job commitment. Spying/snooping is 
a source of invasion at employees work area. Research has been carried out on 
particularly electronic surveillance but not much on the fact that how does spying via 
other co-workers affect the productivity and job commitment of the employees. 
 
  
Hypotheses 
 
H1:  Top management spying in the organization affects the productivity of  
 employees. 
H2: Top management spying in the organization affects the job commitment  
of employees. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
Description of sampling and data 
 
A survey was done for this study in which respondents were randomly selected from 
different organizations of Pakistan. The respondents contained both the male and 
female employees with variety of age, educational background and experience related 
to work. They were directly met and were told about the significance of the study. 
Questionnaires were left there to be filled by them and were collected in the later days.  
The sampling technique that was used in this study was the convenience sampling 
technique. This technique is chosen because of the shortage of time and availability of 
  
respondents to be studied upon. The respondents were the managers and the 
employee of an organization. Sample size of this study was 3500 respondents which 
contained both male and female. They were of different age, educational background 
and work experience. 
 
 
Econometrical modeling 
 
In this research a large sample of respondents’ that is, 3500 employees from the 
various industries and corporate sectors were selected. The data for employee 
productivity and employee job commitments on the basis of snooping/ spying were 
recorded with two different sets of respondents’ categories which included the 
respondents with various levels of agreements in relevance to their productivity and job 
commitments due to spying on them and the respondents has not been affected at all 
by spying. Since the outlined description qualifies for Tobit model selection therefore, 
the association of the employee productivity and job commitment with spying/ snooping 
has been interrogated by censoring the dependent variables (employee productivity and 
job commitment for the cases when snooping/ spying does not matter to them) and then 
applying the Tobit model. 
Censored regression model or the Tobit model is defined as the regression model 
based on censoring the distribution of dependent variable. It is acquired by causing the 
mean in the previous correspond to a conventional regression model. The general 
expression may be given in terms of an index function,  
∗ =  x′  +  
 =  0    if ∗ ≤ 0,  
 =   ∗    if ∗ > 0.  
Since the data of employee productivity and job commitment are censored therefore, 
there are potentially two conditional mean functions we considered, which reflects the 
purpose of the study. While, for the index variable, sometimes called the latent variable, 
∗| x	 is x′ . 
For the recording of the randomly drawn sample from the population, which may or may 
not be censored, the following equation can be used for computing latent variable.  
  
∗| x	 =  Φx
′ 
σ
 x′  +  ,  
Where, 
 =  0 −  x′ /
1 −  Φ0  x′ / =  
 x′ /
Φ x′ /. 
As we are intending to confine our attention to censored observations, then the results 
for the truncated regression model may not apply, because the truncated regression 
model is no more amenable to least squares than the censored data model. 
In the Tobit model the marginal effect of spying on outlined various employee 
productivity and job commitment can be calculated by the following. While, Assuming 
that εis a continuous random variable with mean 0 and varianceσ, andfε|x = fε. 
Whereas, a and b are constants, let f(ε)and F(ε)denote the density and cdf of ε. 
|x	
x =   × Prob a <  y∗ < '	. 
 
 
Proof 
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Collecting terms, we have 
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Now, differentiate with respect to x. The only complication is the last term, for which the 
differentiation is with respect to the limits of integration. We use Leibnitz’s theorem and 
use the assumption that f(ε) does not involve x. Thus,  
  
|x	
x = P
−
 Q (4; − P
−
 Q '4= + 3= − 3; + ′x 4= −  4; P
−
 Q
+  ,=4= − ,;4;	 P− Q. 
After inserting the definitions of αR and αS, and collection terms, we find all terms sum to 
zero save for the desired result,  
|x	
x = 3= − 3; =   × Prob ( < ∗ < '	. 
Censoring at zero and normally distributed disturbance, the result specializes to  
|xT	xT =   Φ 
′xT  
Although not a formal result, this does suggest a reason why, in general, least squares 
estimates of the coefficients in a Tobit model usually resemble the MLEs times the 
proportion of non limit observations in the sample. McDonald and Mofitt (1980) 
suggested a useful decomposition of |xT	/xT,  
|xT	xT =   × UΦT1 − λTαT + λT	 + , +  λTV, 
Where, αT = xT′,ΦT =  Φ, and  =  /Φ. Taking the two parts separately, this result 
decomposes the slope vector into 
|xT	xT = Prob  > 0	
|x . yT > 0	x  +  |x . yT > 0	
∂ Prob > 0	x  
Thus, a change in xi (that is, spying) has two results: It has an effect on the conditional 
mean of ∗  (amount of employee productivity and job commitment) in the positive 
fraction of the distribution and it also affects the probability that the observation will fall 
in that fraction of the distribution. The log-likelihood for the censored regression model 
is  
ln ] =  ^ − 12 Flog2a + ln  +
 − x′  Ibcd e
+ ^ B5 F1 − Φx′  Ibcf e
 
 
 
FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
 
The comparative empirical results of scaled OLS (Tobit model) and OLS (multiple linear 
regression) reveal that the Tobit model is an appropriate, better and robust model that 
  
explain the outlined category of relationship between the variables when dependent 
variable is required to be censored.   
 
Table 1. Tobit estimates for employee productivity due to managerial spying 
Predictors 
Employee 
Productivity 
Scaled 
OLS 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
Coefficient 
(T-Value) Slope 
Constant  
124.82 
(28.89) 
Spying Via 
Technology 
46.131 59.12 27.72 11.38 
(11.74) 
Spying Via 
Coworkers 
57.103 74.12 33.62 13.87 
(15.32) 
Sample size 
Proportion working 
3500 
0.770 
 
Table 2: Tobit estimates for employee job commitment due to managerial spying 
Predictors 
Job Commitment 
Scaled 
OLS 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
Coefficient 
(T-Value) Slope 
Constant  
45.13 
(11.21) 
Spying Via 
Technology 
51.67 70.70 30.14 9.33 
(13.61) 
Spying Via 
Coworkers 
65.52 83.91 41.84 20.09 
(19.03) 
Sample size 
Proportion working 
3500 
0.430 
  
Finding of this paper confirms as they are shown in Table 1, that all of the spying 
techniques which includes spying via technology and spying via coworkers in relevance 
to the various industries adversely affect the employee productivity and job commitment 
at work, while spying via coworkers dissatisfies employees more in terms of productivity 
and job commitment than the spying via technology, as the betas for spying via 
coworkers are found thicker than the spying via technology at t > 1.5, Thus our both 
outlined hypotheses are failed to be rejected. 
 
 
  
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In a contemporary world, where technology is changing too fast, work has become easy 
yet in abundance and more transparent. This transparency is to control employees work 
behavior, task performance, communication levels across organization through 
snooping/spying over them. It is certain that management wants the best of their 
employees so that the business overall delivers more than the expectations. It has been 
noted that spying is now said to be a norm and expected by the organizations and that 
is why new entrants are well-aware of the fact that employers can formally or informally 
snoop around through camera, phone tracking, internet controls and monitors etc. Now, 
since few years yet another way of snooping over employees have emerged frequently 
is through co-workers and other employees. Communication of information through 
informal sources and bypassing hierarchical levels are devastating in numerous ways. 
Such acts affect employee productivity and job commitment. This study results that 
snooping over employees especially through other co-workers and employees has more 
adverse impact on employees’ productivity and job commitment. The key factors are 
stress, depression and mental illness and de-motivation and peer-competition. It gives 
birth to politics within the organizational culture and more business communication 
conflicts occur when the source of snooping through co-workers and other measures is 
revealed to the employees.  
 
 
Implications 
 
The policy makers should be aware about the negativity cause by spying over 
employees and especially via co-workers. Certain policies should be adopted in which 
employees should be un-aware of spying over them and certain informal ways of spying 
can be adopted to avoid lack of job commitment and low productivity at work. Another 
wise approach for the management to track their employees in order to avoid 
misconceptions and above-mentioned issues, is to communicate their monitoring 
system for tracking attitude and performance at the point of hiring, which basically will 
provide a clean slate for the employees to comprehend the monitoring system to be an 
unbiased way of controlling employees. As far as snooping via co-workers is concerned, 
it is found already that this approach has more adverse points and should be avoided by 
  
the management as it is an un-reliable and in most cases a biased way to track 
employees. 
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